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Abstract
A share price in a stock market can be thought of as arising out of an aggregation 
procedure. The price of a stock aggregates many individual beliefs into a collective one, 
the collective will of the market, so to speak.  How does this aggregation come about? 
And is this aggregation fair in the sense that it correctly reflects the value? Furthermore, 
in the context of a stock market, it becomes immediately clear that belief merging cannot 
be separated from belief revision since investors in the market have a direct stake in what 
others think and clearly find it optimal to revise their beliefs in the light of the 
information about what others believe.  We show that if investors are revising their 
beliefs not only after receiving new exogenous information but also after their social 
interactions with other investors and these revised beliefs are getting merged to generate 
the stock price under the accepted principles of finance (no arbitrage) then the resulting 
price dynamics explain a long standing puzzle in finance, the volatility clustering puzzle.
Keyword: Social Influence, Knightian Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Volatility Clustering
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1Introduction
This paper studies the financial market implications of social influences on probability 
judgments. Our results indicate that the social influence may be playing a role in 
generating a key stylized fact (volatility clustering) observed in financial markets.
Most macroeconomic time series relations are non-stationary with structural 
instability.2 It implies the relevance of Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) where a single 
objective probability distribution cannot be assigned to future outcomes; rather, a set of 
distributions is available any of which can be true.3
How do people act under Knightian uncertainty? With multiple distributions there is 
no given anchor for expectations and without an anchor macroeconomic equations cannot 
give meaningful results. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) propose that the conservative 
nature of agents provides an anchor for expectations and this is the foundation for their 
maxmin expected utility approach under Knightian uncertainty. In their approach, agents 
pick the most pessimistic distribution from the set of possible distributions and then act 
accordingly.
In this paper, we propose that the social context of a person may provide an anchor 
for expectations and explore the financial market implications of this proposition. Social 
context is an important factor affecting our judgments and beliefs. Social psychologists 
have documented both implicit as well as explicit social influences on our judgments and 
beliefs. The very nature of interpersonal relations involve influencing others and getting 
influenced by others. Our thoughts, judgments, actions all seem to be greatly influenced 
by what others think and do. These influences operate both at conscious as well as 
subconscious level and affect us in a variety of explicit as well as subtle ways.
A decision maker is just a name given to a  utility function which is maximized 
subject to a model, where a model of an agent is his belief regarding the transition law 
linking the state variable to the control. There is strong empirical evidence that markets 
have internal dynamics of their own and over the last two decades a series of phenomena 
                                                
2  See Clements and Hendry (1999), Stock and Watson (1996), Davidson (1991).
3 Frank Knight, the father of the Chicago school of economics, is one of the earliest economists to 
recognize the relevance of Knightian uncertainty. See Knight (1921).
2that are anomalies under rational expectations finance have been documented. 
Furthermore, the conclusions from empirical time series literature is that most 
macroeconomic time series relations are non-stationary with structural instability, hence 
making it impossible for any agent to have the kind of structural knowledge that the 
theory demands. Hence, all decision makers face ambiguity. Social psychologists have 
extensively studied the link between decisions made by an individual under ambiguity 
and his social context and have documented that social context has a strong influence on 
an individual’s decisions and especially so under ambiguity. This means that economic 
phenomena under ambiguity are in essence socioeconomic phenomena demanding that 
we consider both individual economic incentives as well as the social context as the 
determinant of human behavior.  So, a decision maker under ambiguity is a utility 
function which is maximized subject to a model that is open to social influence.
This paper carries out this modification and puts forward a model of social 
interactions under ambiguity. The time series generated by the model displays a key
stylized fact observed in the financial market time series. The stylized fact, called 
volatility clustering is considered a puzzling feature for which no convincingly 
explanation exists.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we present evidence from social 
psychology that social influences play a crucial role in human behavior. Then, we present 
our model and simulation results.
1. Examples of Implicit (Subconscious) Social Influence on Judgment from Social 
and Cognitive Psychology
In the light of what social psychologists tell us, people’s judgments and behaviors can 
be influenced by the most innocuous and subtle manipulations. Thus, people express 
more favorable opinions about the future of the economy after they have seen a happy 
rather than a sad movie (see Forgas and Moylan, 1987); they agree more with a proposal 
to raise tuition after they hear it while nodding their heads in a vertical (yes) rather than a 
horizontal (no) manner (see Wells and Petty, 1980); and they are more likely to interrupt 
somebody after they unscramble sentences with rude rather than polite content (see Bargh 
et al. 1996).  In a very interesting study (Steele and Aronson, 1995) black students were 
3asked to participate in a GRE-style test. In one version of the test, the students were given 
a pretest in which they were asked to identify their race. Steele and Aronson found that 
asking black students to identify their race in a pretest question reduced the number of 
right answers in the actual test by half.  This is a startling result indicating that race 
identification was enough to generate all the negative stereotypes in the unconscious 
minds of participants. This negative preconditioning or priming (in the jargon of social 
psychology) greatly reduced the performance of black students.  It makes one wonder 
whether people who go to expensive private schools perform better than others because 
of the constant positive priming rather than ability. 
These and other effects appear to occur without a person’s awareness; that is, they are 
implicit. When people are attempting to be rational, they presumably would not want 
their judgment of the economy to be influenced by the type of movie they have seen, or 
their judgment of an important issue to be influenced by their head movements, or their 
social behavior to be influenced by an irrelevant cognitive task they have just completed, 
or their test performance to be influenced by a seemingly innocent question.
The fact that people’s judgments are influenced by irrelevant events and tasks makes 
it impossible to dissociate their states of mind from their social contexts.  Hence, it is 
crucial to take into account a decision maker’s social context in determining his behavior. 
It is interesting to speculate that these subtle social influences can potentially provide 
insights into the different economic performances of different geographic units. 
Economic development or growth is affected by entrepreneurial activities and any 
entrepreneurial task requires the entrepreneur to make probability judgments.  It can be 
argued that different social contexts (as an example, cultural optimism or pessimism) 
would lead to different judgments and different levels of entrepreneurial activity.
2. Examples of Explicit Social Influence on Judgment from Social and Cognitive 
Psychology
Social psychologists have shown that even in very simple situations, people are 
willing to follow the majority and abandon their own judgment when provided with 
information that others think differently from them. In a series of experiments inspired by 
Asch (1952), Deutsch and Gerard (1955) show that people are greatly influenced by 
4majority opinion. In their experiments, each subject was asked to answer simple 
questions based on the length of line segments shown to him or her. Each subject almost 
always gave correct answers when asked individually in isolation. However, when the 
false information that a majority of others had answered differently was conveyed to 
them, about 35% of the time they changed their answers and agreed with the incorrect 
answers. These experiments are important because they show that even in very simple 
situations people are willing to abandon their judgment in favor of the majority. The urge 
to trust majority judgment over one’s own judgment is likely to be even stronger when 
the situation is as highly ambiguous as in financial markets.
Sherif (1936) was one of the first social psychologists to investigate social influence 
on judgment. He presented participants with a stationary dot of light for 2 seconds in an 
otherwise dark room. This created an optical illusion known as the autokinetic effect: the 
stationary dot appeared to jump around. When participants were asked to judge how 
much the light had moved, they typically gave an estimate of around 1 to 10 inches. 
When group of participants were asked to announce their estimates out loud on 
consecutive days, a norm emerged. Their estimates gradually converged. In Sherif’s 
study, participants cannot be sure about how much the light moved. Similarly, people 
cannot be sure about the true probability distribution of an uncertain prospect.  In Sherif’s 
experiment the judgments of others affected the judgment of a participant. Similarly, the 
judgment of others about the probabilities associated with an uncertain prospect may 
affect a person’s belief.
 Campbell (1961) examined conformism in a task where the correct answer is highly 
ambiguous. He formed micro-“societies” of two, three, and four individuals in which 
only one or two were real subjects, the remainder being confederates. Real and fake 
subjects were placed together in a darkened room and shown a fixed spot of light, then 
asked to estimate the distance that the light had traveled. In the experiment the light did 
not, in reality, travel at all—it was fixed. However, it is well known that due to a 
consistent optical illusion, people think the light moves about 4 inches: it’s called the 
autokinetic effect, as mentioned before. The confederates gave their estimate first, and 
they had been instructed to give estimates (16 inches) much higher than the usual 
estimates. Then the real subjects would give it a try.  In the experiment this constituted 
5the first “generation.” For the second “generation,” one of the fake subjects was removed 
and replaced with a real one and all participants then proceeded to make estimates again. 
This procedure was repeated until the micro-”society” was composed exclusively of real 
subjects. From then on, in each “generation,” a real subject would be removed and 
replaced with another real subject, for a total of eleven “generations.” What did they 
find? When there is only one confederate (fake subject) and two real subjects, the wildly 
high estimate of the lonely confederate (16 inches) nevertheless has some influence, as in 
the first generation the real subjects give estimates higher than 4 inches, though always 
below 9. When there are two confederates—a 2/3 majority—and only one real subject, 
the latter is quite strongly influenced and in the first generation gives a very similar 
estimate, about 14 inches. 
3. Towards an Economic Framework Incorporating Social Influence on beliefs 
under Knightian Uncertainty
Economic literature on social influence can be divided into sections: 1) Preference 
modification 2) Belief modification, since social influence can affect both preferences as 
well as beliefs. Belief modification literature uses the idea of information cascades due to 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). In information cascades, decisions are 
made in a sequence so later decision makers have an opportunity to combine their private 
information with the information inferred from the actions of others. In equilibrium, they 
may find it optimal to ignore their private information in favor of the information inferred 
from others. 
In this paper, we assume that investors make decisions simultaneously so information 
cascades cannot arise. As discussed in the previous section, social psychologists have 
extensively studied the link between decisions made by an individual under ambiguity 
and his social context and have documented that social context has a strong influence on 
an individual’s decisions and especially so under ambiguity. This means that economic 
phenomena under ambiguity are in essence socioeconomic phenomena demanding that 
we consider both individual economic incentives as well as the social context as the 
determinant of human behavior. This paper carries out this modification and puts forward 
a model of asset pricing with social influence on probability judgments under Knightian 
6uncertainty. The time series generated by our model displays a key stylized fact observed 
in financial market time series. The stylized fact called volatility clustering is a puzzling 
feature in the real world data. Before presenting our model, we provide a brief description 
of the volatility clustering phenomenon.
3.1 Volatility Clustering
Volatility clustering is one of the most important “stylized facts” in financial 
markets.  A large number of empirical studies report that while changes in asset prices 
appear to be random the magnitude (amplitude) of these changes has a structure to it.  
Changes of large magnitude typically tend to follow changes of large magnitude and 
changes of small magnitude tend to follow changes of small magnitude. This is called 
volatility clustering.
Mandelbrot (1963) first discovered this phenomenon in commodity prices.  
However, it is the pioneering work of Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) on 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) models and their generalization 
GARCH models that brought this phenomenon to the forefront of economic research. 
Volatility clustering has been shown to be present in a wide variety of financial assets 
including stock market indices, as well as exchange rates. In empirical work, volatility 
clustering is usually modeled by a statistical model such as GARCH or one of its 
extensions. As noted by Engle (2001), these models are only statistical descriptions of the 
data and they do not provide any structural explanation as to why the phenomenon arises. 
Rather, the statistical models postulate that volatility clustering has an exogenous source 
and is for example caused by the clustered arrival of random news about the economic 
fundamentals. See Engle (2004).
Theoretical modern finance models based on rational expectations cannot generate 
volatility clustering. See Bossaerts (2003) for a detailed discussion of the empirical 
failure of rational expectations hypothesis. The causes of volatility clustering are poorly 
understood. Engle (2001) writes:
“The goal of volatility analysis must ultimately be to explain the causes of volatility. 
While, the time series structure is valuable for forecasting, it does not satisfy our need to 
7explain volatility. Thus far, attempts to find the ultimate cause of volatility are not very 
satisfactory.”4
3.2 The Model
We take it to be axiomatic that people disagree about the probabilities of events 
even when exposed to the same information. In the economics literature, this position is 
taken, as an example, by Rubinstein (1993), who thinks that it is obvious that agents 
interpret the same information differently: 
“Agents reading the same morning newspapers with the same stock price lists will 
interpret the information differently.”5
Empirical evidence also supports this assertion. Kandel and Pearson (1995) test and 
accept6 the hypothesis that agents in speculative markets interpret the same information 
differently. Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) test and accept the hypothesis that different 
forecasters interpret the same information differently while forecasting inflation. 
Our model has three sets of assumptions:
1) Assumptions about belief formation
2) Assumptions about price formation
3) Assumptions about updating confidence
3.2.1 Assumptions about belief formation
Each period, all agents receive the same information. They use a mental model to 
convert this information into a belief about the price level next period. There is a 
commonly known part of the model about which every one agrees and there is an 
                                                
4 Engle, R. (2001). GARCH 101: The Use of ARCH/GARCH Models in Applied Econometrics. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 15(4), page 166.
5 Rubinstein (1993), page 473.
6 Technically, they reject the null of identical interpretation. However, it is customary to write that the 
alternative is accepted with the implicit understanding that rejection of the null is implied. As one example, 
Kurz (1997a), page 3, does the same.
8unknown part about which agents disagree.7 Let tp be the interpretation of this 
information according to the commonly known part of the model. Each agent’s belief 
(expectation about the next period’s price level), itx  is some perturbation 
of tp : ][ 1 titittpit pEx  . This perturbation accounts for the idiosyncratic differences 
between different agents’ mental models. 
After forming his belief, each agent interacts with people in his social circle. These 
interactions influence his belief. This is captured by considering a 2-dimensional lattice 
and assigning a cell to each agent with neighboring cells as his neighbors. Each agent’s 
belief is affected by his interactions with his neighbors. Let itz represent the belief of 
agent i after interacting with his neighbors:
  ]|[,' 1 nsInteractioSocialpExbeliefsneighborsfz tititit     
where f  is some function describing how neighbors’ beliefs influence an agent’s belief.
Obviously, people have a direct interest in discovering and influencing the beliefs 
of others since stock price is a reflection average market beliefs. Keynes (1936) is one of 
the earlier economists to explicitly recognize this fact. He compared stock market 
behavior to a beauty contest:
“Each competitor has to pick not those faces he himself finds prettiest, but those which he 
thinks are likeliest to catch the fancy of other competitors.”8
Note that there does not have to be any explicit communication of beliefs since 
beliefs can be influenced by even the most innocuous and subtle clues as psychological 
evidence in section 1 shows. As an example, if people in one’s social circle are exuberant 
since their team has won a football match then that exuberance may subconsciously make 
one an optimist in investment decisions also. Anecdotal evidence of such behavior 
abound. As one example, the Pakistani Stock Exchanges made significant upward 
movements after their team won the cricket world cup in 1992.
                                                
7 Manski (2003) argues that econometricians trying to estimate a model are almost always in this position.
8 Keynes (1936), page 156.
93.2.2 Assumptions about price formation
Each agent optimizes given his belief after social interactions, itz . The standard 
optimization exercise with one risk-free and one risky asset produces a demand curve for 
the risky asset of each agent. Assuming that the number of shares outstanding is constant 
and by equating them with aggregate demand, we can solve for the equilibrium price:9
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where r  is the one period risk free net return, N  is the total number of agents and 1td is 
the intervening dividend. Similarly, in the next period, the whole process repeats, new 
information arrives  pt )1(  , new private beliefs  )1( tix  are formed, new beliefs after 
social interactions are formed, and the new equilibrium price 1tp is determined.
3.2.3 Assumptions about updating confidence
Once 1tp is known, each agent compares the expectation error of his belief before 
social interactions, ][ 11   titt pEp  with the expectation errors of his neighbors. If his 
expectation error is greater than the expectation error of his neighbors, he assigns a 
greater weight to their opinion in the next period. If his error is smaller, he assigns a 
lower weight to the opinion of his neighbors in the next period. We describe the exact 
weighting function, when we set the parameters of the simulation (next section).
In summary, the model works in the following way: All agents receive the same 
information each period. They interpret this information differently to arrive at different 
beliefs about the next period’s price level. Then, they interact with agents in their social 
                                                
9 See the Appendix for a standard derivation of this equation. Brock and Hommes (1998) derive this equation as an 
extension of asset pricing model to the case of heterogeneous expectations. Some authors such as Arthur et al. (1997) 
derive this equation from no-arbitrage arguments without any explicit optimization exercise. Also see Chiarella and He 
(2001, 2002, 2003), Farmer and Joshi (2002), Lebaron (2000), 
Lebaron et al. (1999), Lux and Marchesi (1999), and Lesourne (1992). Note that the wealth does not appear in this 
equation. Individual wealth obviously has an effect on an individual’s allocation decision. However, for the 
determination of stock price aggregate wealth distribution may be relevant and not the individual wealth. In any case, 
the focus of this paper is on how belief changes caused by social influence cause price changes; therefore we ignore 
any other variable except beliefs.
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circle and these interactions influence their beliefs. Each agent optimizes (by choosing 
between a risky and a risk free asset) given his belief after social interactions and in this 
process equilibrium price level is determined. After the determination of equilibrium 
price next period, each agent calculates his expectation error and compares it with his 
neighbors’ errors and accordingly adjusts the importance he attaches to his neighbors 
opinions.
3.2.4 Simulation Parameters
In what follows, subscripts ij denote the location of an agent in a 2-dimensional 
plane divided into cells (lattice). We use the following parameter values for simulation:
]05.0,05.0[ pricecurrentpricecurrentpricecurrentpricecurrenttp 
]05.0,05.0[ pricecurrentpricecurrentvijt 
r =0.05, N =40000, tjidE tijt ,,1][ 1 
tp represents the interpretation of new information according to the commonly known 
part of the model. Each period, tp takes a random value from a uniform distribution with 
the range defined above. The role of tp in the model is to ensure a steady arrival of new 
information each period. The results presented here are robust to the range of values 
tp can take.10 ijtv is the idiosyncratic element in each agent’s belief. Each period, for each 
agent, a random value is drawn from a uniform distribution with the range defined above. 
Together, these two parameters ensure that different agents have different interpretations 
in accordance with Knightian uncertainty. We use the simplest linear form for the 
function ijtz  (belief after social interactions, that is, ]|[ 1 nsInteractioSocialpEz tijtijt   ):11
                                                
10 Of course, negative values are not allowed since price is a strictly non-negative variable.
11 Using a linear specification is preferred for the following reasons: Even the simplest of nonlinear 
specification can generate extremely rich behavior such as bifurcations, strange attractors and chaos. See 
Gulick (1992), Preston (1983), Collet and Eckmann (1980). So, in a nonlinear specification one cannot be 
sure whether the results are due to social influence or due to the nature of nonlinearity. For a detailed 
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ijtijtijt xcbaz  (1)
    
Where a  and c  are positive parameters, ijtb is the average belief in the neighborhood of 
agent ij , that is, 
4
)1()1()1()1(   jijijijiijt xxxxb  where ,,, )1()1()1(  jijiji xxx  and 
)1( jix  denote the beliefs of neighbors immediately to the right, left, above, and below the 
agent, respectively. We assume that each agent has 4 neighbors.12 ijtx is the own belief of 
agent ij . Equation (1) states that the belief after social interactions depends on the 
average belief in one’s social circle as well as on one’s own initial predisposition. 
Parameters a  and c  control the relative importance that an agent attaches to others’ 
opinion in his social circle. We will refer to a  as intensity of social influence and c  as 
own confidence.
For updating confidence, if the expectations error of an agent is greater than the 
expectation error of average neighborhood belief, that is,
If ijttijtt bpxp   11 ]
then a  goes up by an amount g which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution: 
 aag  50.0,10.0 . 
If the expectation error of an agent is less than the expectation error of average 
neighborhood belief then a  goes down by g . The rationale behind this assumption is as 
follows: if a person’s social circle outperforms him then plausibly he will assign a greater 
weight to their opinion in the next future. How much greater? That depends on his state 
                                                                                                                                                
discussion of rich behavior of nonlinear systems, see Drazin (1992) or May (1976). We suspect that 
linearity is preferred in social interactions literature (preference modification) for the same reason. See 
Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000).  It may very well be the case that financial markets are nonlinear systems 
as argued in the econophysics literature. See Wille (2004). However, the implications of nonlinearity (and 
chaos) for financial markets have been studied elsewhere. See Guanersdorfer et al. (2003), Guanersdorfer 
(2000), Hommes and Guanersdorfer (2003).
12 Face-to-face interactions with people with whom one has strong social ties are likely to have the 
strongest influence on one’s judgment. Typically, the number of such people is small (average 3.8 for 
innermost social circle). Results are similar for either 4 or 8 neighbors. Due to the sampling issue, it is clear 
that results will get weaker for larger neighborhoods with our model becoming equivalent to modern asset 
pricing model for very large neighborhoods (social influence will cancel out).
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of mind at the moment of decision, which depends on a lot of environmental factors (such 
as the type of movie he just saw).13 These environmental factors are essentially random. 
3.2.5 Simulation Results
The results depend on the relative importance of neighbors beliefs ijtb  versus one’s 
own idiosyncratic predisposition ijtx . That is, on the relative magnitudes of parameters 
a and c . A number of representative simulations are run:
1. Simulation without social interactions. This simulation is run to establish the 
benchmark. 
2. Simulation with social interactions and the parameter values: a =0.80, c =0.20
3. Simulation with social interactions and the parameter values: a =0.60, c =0.20
4. Simulation with social interactions and the parameter values: a =0.40, c =0.20
5. Simulation with social interactions and the parameter values: a =0.20, c =0.20
3.2.5.1 Simulation without Social Interactions
If there is no social influence, our model reduces to modern asset pricing model 
(substitute a =0, and c =1 in equation (1)). See Figure 1. Unsurprisingly, Figure 1 is 
similar to output from a typical modern asset pricing model. See Tsay (2002). Returns are 
measured as changes in log-price. Of course, there is no volatility clustering.
                                                
13 Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking. Little, Brown.
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-0.02
0
0.02
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1 425 849 1273 1697 2121 2545 2969 3393 3817 4241 4665 5089 5513 5937 6361
Time
Figure 1. Returns without Social Interactions
3.2.5.2 Simulation with social interactions, a=0.80 and c=0.20
Figure 2 shows the returns generated by our model when a =0.80 and c =0.20
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
1 256 511 766 1021 1276 1531 1786 2041 2296 2551 2806 3061 3316 3571 3826
Time
Intensity.of.Social.Influence=0.80,Own.Confidence=0.20
Figure 2. Returns
Volatility clustering can be seen clearly in figure 2. Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) regression can be employed as a test for volatility clustering. 
See Tsay (2002), Engle (2001) or any text in financial econometrics (such as Wang 
(2003). If coefficients are significant than volatility clustering is present. As reported in 
Table 1, ARCH coefficients are significant, indicating volatility clustering.
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ARCH(1) REGRESSION: TEST FOR VOLATILITY CLUSTERING
Estimate Error t-Value p-Value ARCH EFFECT
ARCH0 0.000093 1.17E-05 7.94 <.0001 Yes
ARCH1 0.9133 0.0689 13.26 <.0001 Yes
Table 1
3.2.5.3 Simulation with social interactions, a=0.60 and c=0.20
Figure 3 shows the returns generated by our model when a =0.80 and c =0.20.
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1 257 513 769 1025 1281 1537 1793 2049 2305 2561 2817 3073 3329 3585 3841
Time
Intensity.of.Social.Influence=0.60,Own.Confidence=0.20
Figure 3. Returns
As before, volatility clustering can be seen. 
We test for volatility clustering and find significant volatility clustering (see Table 2).
ARCH(1) REGRESSION: TEST FOR VOLATILITY CLUSTERING
Estimate Error t-Value p-Value ARCH EFFECT
ARCH0 0.000072 8.80E-06 8.18 <.0001 Yes
ARCH1 0.8818 0.0674 13.07 <.0001 Yes
Table 2
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3.2.5.4 Simulation with social interactions, a=0.40, c=0.20
As can be seen from figure 4, volatility clustering is present. This is confirmed by 
the ARCH regression results reported in Table 3.
-0.08
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0
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1 255 509 763 1017 1271 1525 1779 2033 2287 2541 2795 3049 3303 3557 3811
Time
Intensity.of.Social.Influence=0.40, Own.Confidence=0.20
Figure 4. Returns
ARCH(1) REGRESSION: TEST FOR VOLATILITY CLUSTERING
Estimate Error t-Value p-Value ARCH EFFECT
ARCH0 4.38E-05 5.27E-06 8.31 <.0001 Yes
ARCH1 0.8147 0.0634 12.85 <.0001 Yes
Table 3
3.2.5.5 Simulation with social interactions, a=0.20, c=0.20
Figure 5 shows the returns generated by our model when a =0.20 and c =0.20.
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Figure 5
We test for volatility clustering and find significant volatility clustering (see Table 4).
ARCH(1) REGRESSION: TEST FOR VOLATILITY CLUSTERING
Estimate Error t-Value p-Value ARCH EFFECT
ARCH0 2.18E-05 2.65E-06 8.23 <.0001 Yes
ARCH1 0.6922 0.057 12.15 <.0001 Yes
Table 4
4. Conclusion
Human are social animals and their social interactions undoubtedly affect their 
judgments. We present an exploratory model of social influence on judgment. Our results 
indicate that social influence may be playing a role in generating volatility clustering 
observed in financial markets.
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APPENDIX
Brock and Hommes (1998) put forward a simple model of asset pricing with 
heterogeneous beliefs (BH model). Their model is now a workhorse for literature with 
heterogeneous expectations. Guanersdorfer et al (2003), Guanersdorfer (2000), Chiarella 
and He (2003), Chiarella and He (2002), Chiarella and He (2001), Farmer and Joshi 
(2002), Lebaron (2000), Lebaron et al (1999), Lux and Marchesi (1999), and Lesourne 
(1992) are a few examples of use of this model. 
In Brock and Hommes (1998), there are two types of assets, a risk free asset and a 
risky asset. Risk free asset pays a net return of r , which is between 0 and 1. That is, for a 
dollar of investment, the gross return is )1( r  after a unit interval.  Let tp  denote the 
price of risky asset that pays dividends, d .  The dynamics of wealth of an agent type ‘a’ 
is described by 
attatta SRrWW 11, )1(      (A.1)
where 1tR  is the excess return (in dollars) per share of risky asset over risk free asset, 
that is, tttt prdpR )1(111    and atS  is the number of shares of risky asset 
bought by an agent of type ‘a’.  
Let tE  and tV   denote conditional expectation and conditional variance, and 
let atE and atV  denote the beliefs of investor type ‘a’ about these conditional expectation 
and variance.
Assume that investors are mean-variance maximizers.14 The demand for shares of 
risky asset by an agent of type ‘a’ can be obtained as follows.
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where e is interpreted as a risk aversion parameter.15
Assume a constant supply of outside shares over time, m . Further, assume that all agents 
agree about the variance and that the market clears:
                                                
14 Mean-Variance Optimization is a decision making model proposed by Markowitz (1952) as an 
alternative to Expected Utility decision model. The Expected utility model gives the same results as the 
Mean-Variance model if the utility function is quadratic or returns are normally distributed. Levy and 
Markowitz (1979) show that mean-variance analysis can be regarded as a Taylor approximation (second 
order) of any given utility function (such as power utility) in the Expected Utility model. Rabin (2000) 
argues that Expected Utility model is absurd as a model of human decision making. The Mean-Variance 
model is simpler, though less general; however, it does not suffer from serious plausibility issues such as 
the one raised by Rabin (2000).
15 Not to be confused with the risk aversion parameter in the Expected Utility Model.
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Define risk adjusted dividend as, )(` 111   tttt RVe
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